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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARJORIE WINTERS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

Case No.

15523

CHARLES ANTHONY, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover the value of jewelry bailed
to the Defendant-Appellant for the purpose of reworking the
jewelry into a different piece.

The reconstructed piece was

subsequently either lost or stolen and remains undelivered to
the Plaintiff-Respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried on the 29th day of September, 1977,
before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, sitting without a
jury.

On the 19th day of October, 1977, judgment was awarded

in favor of Respondent in the amount of eight thousand one
hundred and eighty dollars ($8,180.00), together with all court
costs and interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) from May
25, 1976.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a remittitur of the damages assessed by
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the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 23rd of March, 1976, Respondent took a gold
bracelet set with sixty-three green stones and fifty-four
half pearls to Appellant's place of business at Trolley
Square in order to have it converted into a cross to be
worn as a pendant or pin.

The bracelet was a gift received

by Respondent around July of 1970 from Respondent's brotherin-law.

The alterations were completed by Appellant around

April 15, 1976.
On the 12th of May, 1976, Respondent tendered one hundred
dollars ($100.00) as a partial payment for the work done;
the total cost of the remanufacture was one hundred twenty-six
dollars ($126.00).

Subsequently, Appellant delivered the

pendant cross to a Mr. H. J. Vanderveer for appraisal.
Vanderveer had seen the item prior to its reconstruction.
Vanderveer determined that the green stones were emeralds;
he then assigned a value to them, the half pearls, and the
piece in toto.
On the 14th day of June, 1976, Respondent returned to
Appellant's place of business to pick up the completed item.
She was informed by an employee of Appellant that the pendant
was missing; the pendant has never been relocated.

Whereupon,

Respondent commenced an action for the value of said pendant
in Third District Court.
Respondent brought a motion for Summary Judgment which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

was denied by the court and the matter proceeded to trial.
Conflicting testimony concerninq the value of the lost pendant
was given by Barry Nash, an employee of Appellant, and H. J.
Vanderveer.

The

tri~l

court adopted as the measure of

damages the appraisal value of the pendant as determined by
H. J. Vanderveer, stating in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law #3:
That the market value, the replacement
cost to the Plaintiff, and appraisal
value of the cross were the same.
The only matter that now concerns the Court is the
appropriate valuation of the damaqes suffered by the Respondent.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE APPRAISAL
VALUE AS THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
In its Findinqs of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial
court determined that the appraisal value was the figure of
recovery for the Respondent, concludinq that the market value
and replacement costs of the pendant were equal to that of
the appraised value.

In arriving at this determination,

the court committed error in that it failed to utilize the
appropriate measure of damages.
The appropriate measure of damages is market value,
which is the same as replacement cost.
8 Arn. Jur. 2d, Bailments §332 states that where bailed
goods are lost or destroyed, the measure of damages is the
value of the property at time and place of loss. §333 of the
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same work states: "The value of the property for purposes
of ascertainment of the damages is ordinarily determined
reference to its fair market value ... "

0

As a matter of law,

market value is to be determined by sales in the ordinary
course of business.

Herein, sales in the ordinary course

of business reflect the Salt Lake City retail jewelry

tra~.

In Clack-Nomah Flying Club v. Sterling Aircraft, Inc.,
17 Ut. 2d 245, 408 P2d 904

(1965), a case involving the

destruction of an airplane by a windstorm while in the
custody of a bailee, this Court stated:
This Court has consistently held that
a bailee for hire is respon~ ble for
the value of goods entrustec to him
which he fails to return ... 408 P2d 904

(1965)

The Court went on to hold the bailee liable for the
value of the unreturned aircraft.

The Clack-Nomah decision

did not discuss how it arrived at the value of the aircraft.
However, the means by which value for personal property
that is lost or destroyed is determined was settled by
Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241 P2d 914 (1952).
The Park case involved a breach of warranty, the warranty
arising when defendant's agents promised that a certain
chicken feed would be of great benefit to plaintiff's egglaying chickens when, in fact, it ultimately killed them.
The Court upheld an instruction to the jury which read:
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... plaintiff is entitled to
compensation for an amount
that will correspond to the
market value of the chickens
which died ...
241 P2d 914, 921 (1952)
The Court has thus upheld language consistent with the
general measure of damages as referred to in 8 AM JUR 2d
Bailments, supra.
The Park decision contains language which serves as a
guide in all damage claims:
The fundamental principle of damages
is to restore the injured to the
position he would have been in had
it not been for the wrong of the
other party.
241 P2d 914, 920 (1952)
In determining the method by which a party could be
restored to his pre-injury condition, the Court determined:
... that where property is destroyed,
the true measure of damages is the
difference between the market value
of that property immediately before
the destruction and its replacement
value.
241 P2d 914, 921 (1952)
Application of the replacement cost as the market
value, as Park suggested, found realization in U.
Hatahley, 257 F2d 920

s.

v.

(10th Cir. 1958); therein several

Navajo Indians sued the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (28 USCA 1346(b) and 2671 et. seq.) for
damages when a number of horses and burros were seized
and destroyed in Utah by the United States Bureau of
Land Management.

The trial court set damages at $100,000.00;

the case eventually reached the United States Supreme
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Court (Hatahley v. U.S. 351 U.S. 173 (1956)) where a
remand was ordered to the District Court on the damages
issue.

The case again reached the Tenth Circuit.

There

Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., Supra. was quoted (re the
fundamental principle of damages) and the Court of Appeals
held:
... applying this rule, the plaintiffs
were entitled to the market cost, or
replacement cost of their horses and
burros as of the time of taking ..•
257 F2d 920, 923 (emphasis added)
Hertz Lease Plan, Inc. v. Urban Transportation and
Planning Assoc., Inc., 342 So2d 886

(La. App. 1977), was

a recent case which also opted for damages based upon
replacement costs.

In that case, the defendant leased two

office calculators from the plaintiff.
for default upon the lease.

The plaintiff sued

The Louisiana appellate court

held, inter alia, that the lessor was entitled to recover
the replacement value of one calculator lost by the lessee.
A court should, in arriving at a fair market value, consider
the availability and price of like items; this the trial court
failed to do herein.
In restoring Respondent to the position she would have
been in had it not been for Appellant's wrong, the correct
measure is the market value of the lost pendant cross.
Utah law, as held by this Court in Park v. Moorman
Mfg. Co., Supra, finds replacement value to be determinative
factor for lost or destroyed personality.
Mr. Nash on page 36 of the trial transcript (T. 36)
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testified that, "I feel we could compose a piece (identical
to the lost pendant) for somewhere between 3- and $4,000."
Mr. Nash further testified that a similar item in Salt Lake
City would retail at around five thousand dollars ($5,000.00)
(T. 38).

This figure represents the true market value in

the Salt Lake City retail market, the market that is determinative as to recovery.

This figure is considerably less

than the $8,180.00 amount of damages assigned by the trial
court through application of an inappropriate standard; it
is $3,180 to $4,180 less.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE APPRAISAL
VALUE WAS EQUAL TO MARKET VALUE BECAUSE IN THE SALT LAKE CITY
RETAIL MARKET, THE PENDANT COULD NOT HAVE COMMANDED THE
APPRAISAL VALUE.
As noted above, the replacement cost of the pendant,
upon which suit is brought, would be significantly less than
the appraised value.

This also reflects the difference

between the true market value of the pendant and the appraised
value.

In Utah,
As a general rule, market value is the
highest price a purchaser is willing to
pay for property, not being under compulsion to buy, and the lowest price a seller
is willing to accept, not being under
compulsion to sell.
Northern Oil Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 353, 140 P2d
329 (1943)

In the Salt Lake City retail jewelry market, the market
which is determinative in this case, Mr. Nash testified, "I
would expect realistically, the high retail figure (of the
pendant) would not be more than five."

($5,000.00 - emphasis
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added).

Utilizing that figure

($5,000)

in the market

value determination as set out in Northern Oil Co. v.
Industrial Commission, Supra., it appears that the trial
court granted an award that was excessive by at least
$3,180.
Recovery must be limited to the Salt Lake City retail
jewelry market.

In Watts v. Nevada Central R. Co., 23 Nev.

154, 44P. 423 (1894), a plaintiff was damaged by the
destruction of hay he had stored with a railroad when
a severe winter struck and his stock died without the
hay.

The court did not permit recovery on the basis of

inflated winter prices, " ... but its fair cash market value
if sold in the market under ordinary circumstances ... "
44 P.

423

(1894)

(emphasis added)

Herein, as Mr. Nash

testified, under ordinary circumstances a pendant like the
one lost could not command a price in the Salt Lake City
retail jewelry market of more than $5,000.00
Mr. Nash's estimate concerning the retail cost of
the pendant reflects his familiarity with the piece of
jewelry and his six years of experience in retail jewelry;
he is cognizant of a critical factor which H. J. Vanderveer,
the appraiser, was not: that a piece of jewelry having
value over a few thousand dollars is not subject to
"keystoning."

Keystoninq was explained by Mr. Vanderveer

at the trial as a doubling of the wholesale price by the
jeweler to arrive at a retail figure

(T 13-14).
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Mr. Nash

testified that " ... When you have an item (that) costs more
than a couple of thousand dollars, retail, a jeweler will
not keystone - he will not double his price to arrive at
(a) retail figure."

(T29-30).

Mr. Vanderveer explained that he doubled the wholesale
value of the emeralds and pearls to arrive at what he
believed to be the retail value (T 12).
The evidence indicates the Salt Lake City retail jewelry
market and replacement cost of Respondent's lost pendant
represents a figure several thousand dollars less than the
award granted by the trial court, i.e., $3,000 - $4,000
less.
The case of Stoll v. Almon C. Judd, 106 Conn. 551, 138 A.
479

(1927), was a situation in which the plaintiff, a jobber

who purchased jewelry from manufacturers and sold to retail
outlets, left his jewelry cases, for safekeeping, with an
employee of defendant's hotel.
stolen.

The cases were then apparently

The trial court awarded judgment for the plaintiff,

from which the defendant appealed.

The trial court had

charged that the plaintiff could recover:
•.. the value in the market open to
the plaintiff at the time of loss.
138 A. 479, 483 (emphasis added)
The defendant complained that this instruction was deficient
because the jury was not instructed that the market value
referred to should be the wholesale market.
The appellate court found, however, that the jury had
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applied the standard forwarded by the defendant, the jury's
award reflecting the wholesale value of the lost jewelry
and bags.

The court stated:
Market value means, generally, the
price for which an article is bought
and sold, and is ordinarily best
established by sales in the ordinary
course of business •.. ·
138 A 479, 483 (emphasis added)

Sales of an item, such as the lost pendant in this
case, in the ordinary course of business would be based
on a figure of around $5,000.00, as testified to by Mr.
Nash.

Therefore, in the market open to Respondent in the

ordinary course of business, a replacement would cost not
more than $5,000 retail.
The case of Lipschutz v. Gordon Jewelry, 373 F. Supp.
375 (S.D. Tex. 1974) involved an action brought to recover
damages resulting from the loss of diamonds sent by a dealer '
to a jeweler.

The "stated value" of the shipment was $273,55i

The defendants argued that the plaintiff had to show the
actual damages suffered rather than merely relying on this
stated value.

The court rejected this argument, finding

that the "asking price" is the accepted measure of damages
in the diamond industry.

Herein, the "asking price" that a

Salt Lake retail jeweler would seek, as testified to by Mr.
Nash, is a figure several thousand dollars less than the
award granted by the trial court.

This "asking price" would

be the amount in "the market open to the plaintiff."

1

Again,

in Salt Lake City, the market figure for a similar pendant
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I

open to the plaintiff would be around $5,000.00.

This

figure should then represent the limits of Respondent's
recovery.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RECEIVING THE APPRAISER'S
TESTIMONY ON THE MARKET VALUE OF THE JEWELRY.
Counsel for Appellant objected at the trial to the fact
that Mr. VanderVeer's testimony on the retail value of the
jewelry was given without proper foundation being provided
regarding VanderVeer's expertise in the Salt Lake City retail
jewelry market

(T 13).

Nevertheless, the court received Vander-

Veer's testimony concerning the retail value of the pendant.
By receiving such testimony, the court committed error.
Vanderveer was not competent to testify as an expert witness
regarding the retail prices of jewelry. Mr. Vanderveer dealt
in the jewelry market as an occasional dealer and appraiser
at the wholesale level, but he admitted he had no experience
at the retail market level.
When this is considered with VanderVeer's incorrect
assumption regarding the retail practice of "keystoning", or
doubling of wholesale, it is clear that Vanderveer was not
competent to testify as an expert on the retail value of
jewelry in the Salt Lake City retail market.
The Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Arnold, 218 Ore.
43, 341 P2d 1089 (1956), a case concerning valuation of a
state condemned leasehold in surface and mineral rights,
stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We have held that an expert cannot
give an opinion unless the facts
upon which his opinion is based
are disclosed by his or other
witness' testimony. P2d 1089, 1101
The facts upon which Vanderveer based his appraisal
reflect incorrect assumptions and a lack of expertise in
the area of retail sales of jewelry.

Such lack of knowledge

concerning the retail market renders VanderVeer's testimony
unpersuasive and incompetent on the subject of value of

t~

pendant cross.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES THAT CREATE
A WINDFALL FOR THE RESPONDENT.

The preceeding pages indicate that any recovery over
the retail market-replacement value is excessive, because
such additional recovery would result in windfall profits
respondent.

~

Respondent did not tender payment for the je~~:

at a price greater than the retail market-replacement value;
in fact, the jewelry in its original state, a bracelet, was
a gift to her.

In Stoll v. Almon C. Judd, Supra. , the Court

declined to award the plaintiff the retail value of the lost
property, determining that a recovery on that figure would
amount to windfall profits.
Herein if the Respondent should be permitted to recover
the amount of damages assigned by the trial court, she would
receive a windfall in excess of $3,000.00

The evidence

clearly supports a recovery of $5,000.00 or less.
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Damages have frequently been reduced where the figure
set by the trial court was determined to be excessive.

I~

is definite as a matter of law that the $8,180 figure set
out by the trial court in this case is disproportionate to
any reasonable limit of compensation due to the fact that:
1) the trial court utilized the wrong measure of damages, and
2) the market value-replacement cost is significantly lower
than the appraisal value.

It can be said that neither the

evidence nor the rules of law support a damage recovery in
the amount declared by the trial court.

This means, as the

court in Farris v. Clark, 158 Mont. 33, 487 P.2d 1307 (1971),
held, inter alia, that it was error to award the plaintiff
with a sum that was inconsistent with the proof of loss and
that the award should have been limited to the market value
of the car that was damaged in the accident, plus towage and
storage.
Here the proof of loss and retail market value point to
a figure of approximately $5,000 for the lost pendant.
Additional recovery creates a windfall for the Respondent.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in applying the measure of
damages and failed to recognize that the appraisal value
is not the same as the market value in the Salt Lake City
retail jewelry trade.

The evidence and rules of law indicate

that the recovery determined by the trial court is excessive.
For the foregoing reasons, the damage award of the
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trial court should be remitted to the appropriate amount.
Respectfully submitted this

c;.lf of

February, 1978.

LANDERMAN & RODGERS

By~e~

Richard C. Landerman
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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of the foregoing brief of defendant-appellant were delivered
to John Preston Creer of Senior & Senior, 1100 Beneficial
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